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Summary 
 
East Asia in the postwar period achieved a miraculous success in economic catching-up 
by technology-borrowing from the West.  Many intuitive arguments hint that the rich 
endowment in education in East Asia was critical for its miraculous success.  However, 
empirical studies on the macroeconomic role of education for East Asian countries have 
been so limited so far that researchers in economics are still uncertain about even basic 
questions such as whether and how education contributed to the East Asian Economic 
Miracle.  This paucity of the empirical analyses can be attributable to the lack of 
detailed dataset for education stock.  This paper presents nearly-100-year-long annual 
estimates of education stock for Japan, Korea, Taiwan and the US, which the author 
newly estimated.  The data in this paper provide detailed information such as average 
years of schooling by age groups, by gender, by levels of education, and by types of 
education.  Based on this dataset, this paper investigates similarities and differences 
in the pattern of educational development among those four countries.   In order to 
describe the characteristics of the East Asian Miracle, this paper invents a new 
terminology of ‘military-style heavy industrialization.’ This word refers to the situation 
in which a mass of homogeneously not very highly educated (so-so educated) people 
collaborate methodically in factories (instead of military camps).  This paper argues 
that Japan, Korea and Taiwan succeeded in forming uniform societies, which were 
suited for ‘military-style heavy industrialization.’ This paper also presents the following 
four working hypotheses, which should be further examined with more information in 
future studies: (1) the accumulation of education precedes industrialization, (2) the 
screening effect of education helped Japan, Korea and Taiwan to endure the heavy 
burden of the long “maternity” period of educational investments, (3) tertiary education 
is less important than secondary education in the midst of rapid heavy industrialization, 
and (4) prewar Japan’s heavy investments in vocational education bore fruit in the 
postwar high economic growth.   
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1. Introduction 
 
Education is often idealized.  Both academicians and non-academicians 
frequently express their support for education.  The expansion of education is often 
regarded as the key factor for promoting economic development in developing 
countries. 
  The international organizations are also devoted to educational aid for 
developing countries.  For example, the World Bank promotes education in developing 
countries as a measure of poverty reduction under the slogan of “education for all.”  
This slogan sounds commendable enough to press everybody to support the World 
Bank’s idea.   
  However, there is no clear empirical evidence on the macroeconomic role of 
education.  Some studies such as Barro and Lee (1993) present that education 
accelerates economic growth.  However, others such as Eastery (2001), Prechitt and 
Bils (2001) and Mark and Klenow (2000) shed skeptical views on the macroeconomic 
role of education. In fact, while developing countries succeeded in increasing school 
enrollments, the income gap between the rich and poor countries has been widening 
throughout the postwar period.   This fact implies that education should not be 
regarded as a panacea for economic development.   
  The paucity of the long-term dataset on education stock has stymied the 
empirical analyses on the macroeconomic role of education.  Economists often use the 
datasets of Barro and Lee (2000), Nehru, Swanson and Dubey (1995) and Kim and Lau 
(1995).  While these datasets provide useful information, there remains much room 
for improvement as Godo and Douangngeune (2005) points out.  
 The author constructed a nearly-100-year-long dataset of education stock for 
Japan, Korea, Taiwan and the US (Godo, 2005; Godo and Fukami 2005).12  This 
dataset includes detailed information like average number of years of schooling per 
person (abbreviated as henceforth ‘average schooling’) by gender, by age group, and by 
types and levels of education (i.e., primary, secondary, tertiary and vocational).  The US 
has led the world economy since the late 19th century3.  Japan was the first nonwestern 
                                                  
1 The earlier versions of the author’s are available at Godo and Hayami (1999), Godo (2001), and 
Yamauchi and Godo (2004). 
2 ‘Korea’ in this paper refers to Korea as whole (all the Korean Peninsula) until its independence from 
Japan (1945) and to the Republic of Korea (South Korea) thereafter.  
3 The US has been at the top of the world economy since around 1890 (Maddison, 1995) 
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nation that succeeded in economic catching-up with the advanced nations4.  Taiwan 
and Korea also achieved miraculous economic successes in only 15-20 years after Japan.  
Thus, these four countries comprise a perfect combination to analyze the relationship 
between education and economic development. 
 Using the author’s dataset, this paper examines the East Asian Miracle from 
the view point of human capital.  In order to describe the characteristics of the Miracle, 
this paper invents a new terminology of ‘military-style heavy industrialization.’ This 
word refers to the situation where a mass of homogeneously not very highly educated 
people (so-so educated) young people collaborate methodically in factories.   
This paper finds both similarities and differences among the experiences of 
these three Asian countries.  One of the most important similarities is the big time-lag 
between educational and economic catching-up, which is consistent with the threshold 
hypothesis presented by Lau, Jamison, Liu and Rivikin’s (1993).     
 The next section outlines the author’s methodology of estimating education 
stock.  Section 3 briefly reviews Japan, Korea and Taiwan’s economic catching-up 
processes. Based on the author’s dataset, Sections 4, 5 and 6 examine the 
macroeconomic role of education in Japan, Korea and Taiwan respectively. Section 7 
discusses the implication of the time-lag between educational and economic catching-up 
that this paper commonly finds for these three countries.  Section 8 presents the 
implication of Japan, Korea and Taiwan’s experiences for today’s developing countries. 
 
2. Measuring the Average Level of Education 
 
Average schooling can be calculated by accumulating the total enrollment of 
corresponding years and ages after adjusting for changes in the population due to 
immigration and mortality. For reasons of simplicity, this paper assumes there are no 
differences in education level between immigrants and domestic citizens and no 
correlation between school career and mortality.  Then, let: 
ASm-n, t= Average number of years of schooling in year t for persons of age from 
m to n years in year t;  
Nw,t= Total enrollment of persons of age w years in year t; and  
Gw,t = Total number of persons of age w years in year t.  
 
                                                  
4 It is a popular view among researchers that after the Meiji restoration of 1868 Japan needed 20-30 years 
to complete its ‘transition’ from a feudal to modern state. For example, see Ito (1992: p.16) 
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Then, the average schooling in year t for persons age from m to n years, ASm-n,t, is 
defined as follows: 
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Average schooling for the working-age (age 15 -64) population can be calculated for the 
case of m=15 and n=64. By taking the data of enrollment by levels of education 
(primary, secondary and tertiary), average schooling can be estimated by levels of 
education too.  The problem is that the classification of levels of education differs 
according to time and country.  This paper employs the definition of the US 
Department of Education: the primary level, the secondary level, and tertiary level 
correspond to grades 1-8, grades 9-12, and beyond grade 12 respectively. Likewise, 
average schooling of vocational education can also be estimated as shown in Section 3. 
 Table 1 summarizes the estimation results of average schooling in the 
working-age population and enrollment ratio for the schooling-age (age 6-20) 
population.  While Japan, Korea and Taiwan fell behind the US significantly in the 
prewar period, the gap diminished rapidly in the postwar period.  While there remain 
gaps of 2 to 3 years among those four countries as of 2000, there are almost no 
differences in enrollment ratio.  Thus, the gap in average schooling in the working-age 
population will converge to the same level future.   
 Figure 1 shows the gender gaps of education measured by the female/male 
ratio of average schooling.  No significant gender gap ever existed in the US at least for 
the period of this paper’s analysis.  In contrast, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan had large 
gender gaps in the early period.  These gaps rapidly closed over a century of modern 
economic growth.  As a result, female’s average schooling is now almost par with 
male’s in all four countries.   
 Figure 2 shows how the gender gap in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan decreased 
according to the increase of education level overall.  Korea’s path is amazingly close to 
Japan’s path.  Taiwan’s path is also close to Japan’s and Korea’s.  Taiwan’s path is 
higher than Japan’s and Korea’s after 1970, which means that Taiwan’s educational 
development was less biased in favor of males. 
 It seems reasonable to hypothesize that certain Confucian ideologies and 
traditions in Japan, Korea and Taiwan may have confined women to a subordinate role, 
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which deprived them of the opportunity to receive higher education in the earlier period.  
However, it is also very likely that economic reason mattered more than religious or 
cultural reasons. Factories of the heavy industry require heavy manual labor, in 
particular in the early period of industrialization.  Thus, it may be reasonable for those 
countries to have used the limited resources for males’ education first.  Obviously, more 
investigation is necessary about the reason for the gender gap.  However, it is beyond 
the scope of this paper’s analysis.   
 
3. Overview of the process of economic catching-up  
 
Before looking at details of the autor’s dataset, it is useful to have a quick 
review of the East Asian success story, as shown in Figures 3 and 4 and Table 2.  
Figure 3 shows the convergence of per-capita GDP among those four countries. 
In the prewar period, Japan, Korea and Taiwan fell far behind the US.  However, those 
three countries accomplished marvelous economic achievements in the postwar period. 
The speed of catching-up is particularly high for 1950-70 in Japan, for 1965-95 in Korea 
and for 1960-90 in Taiwan.  These periods are regarded as the East Asian ‘miracle.’  
Figure 4 views economic convergence from a different angle.  This scatter 
diagram takes the inverse of physical capital productivity for vertical axis and the 
inverse of labor productivity for the horizontal axis, which plots unit isoquants of 
conventional macro production function.  Thus, Figure 4 shows the change of 
macroeconomic efficiency and physical capital-labor ratio5.  As can be seen, both 
macroeconomic efficiency and the combination of conventional inputs of the three Asian 
countries have also been converging to the US’s level rapidly in the postwar period.6  
Table 2 shows the change of the industrial structure and demography in the 
three Asian countries.  The right section of Table 2 indicates that the miraculous 
periods coincide with the periods of the expansion of manufacturing sector.  
Interestingly, the expansion of manufacturing sector also coincides with expansion of 
percentage in younger working-age (age 15-39) people in the total population (the left 
section of Table 2).  In sum, Table 2 provides a simple but persuasive story on the East 
                                                  
5 The direction of south-west in Figure 4 means higher macroeconomic efficiency.  The direction of 
north-west (or south-east) means more labor-saving (or labor-intensive) and capital-intensive (or 
capital-saving).   
6 Exception is the 1990s in Japan. In spite of increase in the physical capital – labor ratio, Japan had 
almost zero percent economic growth during the 1990s. 
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Asian Miracle: the Miracle was caused by the increase of factory production that relied 
on profusely abundant supplies of young workers. 
 
4. Japan’s catching-up with the US 
 
To observe the relationship between educational and economic catching-up, we employ 
the framework of macro production function.  A standard macro production function 
with human capital is defined as follows: 
ｙ = f(ｋ, h ), 
 where y = per-capita GDP; k = physical capital-labor ratio; and h = average schooling. 
 Assuming that the US is the frontier of the world economy, this paper uses two 
indicators for the degree of economic catching-up and one indicator for the degree of 
educational catching-up.  Namely, this paper uses the Japan/US ratio in per-capita 
GDP and that in physical capital-labor ratio as indicators of economic catching-up.  In 
Likewise, this paper uses the Japan/US ratio in average schooling as an indicator of 
educational catching-up. 
 Figure 5 traces the changes of these economic and educational indicators since 
the late 19th century.  As can be seen, there is a sharp contrast between the prewar and 
the postwar periods.  In the prewar period, Japan’s per-capita GDP stagnated at 20 to 
30 % of the US’s level7.  Japan’s physical capital-labor ratio remained less than 10 % of 
the US’s level throughout the prewar period.  Those findings demonstrate that Japan 
did not start economic catching-up in the prewar period.  Simultaneously, however, the 
educational indicator reveals that Japan had already started its educational 
catching-up with the US as early as the late 19th century and steadily narrowed the gap 
from the US throughout the prewar period. 
 In contrast to the prewar period, Japan experienced rapid economic 
catching-up in the postwar period.  Since the end of the Pacific War, the Japan/US ratio 
in per-capita GDP and that in physical capital-labor ratio increased sharply in tandem8.  
It is well-known that aggressive investments in physical capital propelled the economy 
in the Japanese high growth era.  Strong effective demand caused by aggressive 
                                                  
7 The ratio increased by nearly 10 % in the 1930s.  But this period should be seen as unusual because 
the US was in the aftermath of Black Thursday and Japan enjoyed a short-lived economic boom brought 
on by the military expansion in the Chinese Continent. 
8 It should be noted that physical capital-labor ratio is a stock term while per-capita GDP is a flow term.  
Physical capital investments (flow data) surged almost simultaneously as per-capita GDP did. 
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physical capital formation created rapid GDP growth, and this rapid GDP growth 
stimulated further investments in physical capital. This virtuous cycle is known by the 
famous key phrase of ‘an investment produces another investment.’  
Japan’s educational catching-up sped down in the postwar period.  This slow 
down is not surprising because the Japan/US ratio had already reached nearly 70 % at 
the beginning of the postwar period.  Around 1990, Japan almost caught up with the 
US both in education and in economy. 
Figure 5 also describes Japan’s economic doldrums in the 1990s.  In this 
period, while Japan increased its physical capital-labor ratio faster than the US, 
Japan’s income gap against the US widened.  Japan seems to have been chasing the 
dream of the high economic growth era even in the 1990s when the virtuous cycle of ‘an 
investment raises another investment’ no longer functioned9.   
Many researchers attribute East Asian Miracle for the rich endowment of 
education stock10.  The postwar part of Figure 5 supports this popular view.  As 
human and physical capitals are complementary, Japan’s high education level in the 
early postwar period guaranteed high return to physical capital investments.  This 
high return triggered the virtuous cycle of ‘an investment raises another investment.’ 
However, the prewar part of Figure 5 raises a tough question: why did Japan 
not achieve economic catching-up in the prewar period?  A nearly-60-year-long time-lag 
exists between the starting point of educational catching-up and that of economic 
catching-up.  How to understand this time-lag is an immense question for researchers.   
One possible answer can be found in the threshold hypothesis presented by 
Lau, Jamison, Liu and Rivikin (1993).  They argue that education will be full-fledged 
only after education stock in the nation surpasses a certain critical level.   
If the threshold hypothesis is the case, why does such a threshold exist?  In 
order to investigate this issue further, this paper proposes a new idea of ‘military-style 
heavy industrialization.’  This word refers to the situation in which a mass of 
homogeneous laborers with a so-so level of education work together methodically at 
factories (instead of military camps).  The scale economy functions in the heavy 
industry.  In addition, developing countries do not need to invent new production 
                                                  
9 It is also interesting the all three indicators in Figure 5 took almost the same level (around 85 %) as of 
1990.  Japan may have finished the phase of catching-up around 1990.  However, Japan seems to have 
failed to find a new system which is suitable for the post catching-up period.  This may be a major 
reason for the long economic slump since 1990.  
10 For example, see World Bank (1993), Asian Development Bank (2001), and Hayami and Godo (2005).  
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technologies by themselves because the advanced technologies already exist in 
developed countries.  Thus, ‘military-style’ should be regarded as a quick way for a 
developing country to implant the heavy industry by borrowing technology from the 
advanced nations. In the case of ‘military-style heavy industrialization,’ it is obvious 
that the economic catching-up does not start unless a homogeneous education extends 
to a certain majority of population. This paper considers that the East Asian Economic 
Miracle was ‘military-style heavy industrialization.’   
 The Japan/US gap by levels of education in Figure 6 displays interesting 
features about Japan’s educational catching-up.  The catching-up of primary education 
comes first.  The second is secondary education, and tertiary education is the last.  
This sequence looks natural.  However, the movement of the Japan/US ratio in tertiary 
education is remarkable.  This ratio increased sharply from the mid-1920s to the early 
1940s. This is triggered by the University Order of 1915 whereby the government 
allowed establishment of private universities (before that, nine of the Imperial 
Universities were the only universities the government authorized).  The surge of 
university graduates coincides with the period of Japan’s heavy industrialization and 
military expansion to Manchuria.  In these years, demands for technocrats and 
bureaucrats (for managing the colonial regimes) expanded.  Thus, the hike in 
Japan/US ratio in tertiary education matched these surging demands.   
 An even more impressive feature is that the Japan /US ratio in tertiary 
education remained constant from the 1950s to the 1980s.  It means that the 
catching-up in tertiary education stagnated as long as 40 years.  This contradicts with 
the common view such as that of Kohama and Watanabe (1996) that the expansion of 
tertiary education promoted postwar Japan’s economic miracle.  This common view 
should be re-examined carefully in two senses.  First, simple comparison of the number 
of annual graduates from university in the prewar period with that in the postwar 
period may not be informative because almost all the nations on the globe (including 
even the countries that showed poor economic performance in the postwar period) 
increased their graduates after the Second World War.  Thus, it is overly simplistic to 
attribute postwar Japan’s economic success to the increase in the number of university 
graduates. Second, researchers should pay more attention to the fact that advanced 
countries, in particular the US, have heavily invested in tertiary education since the 
1940s.  The US government provided scholarships to ex-servicemen and sponsored 
science research (partly with the intension of military use) in universities.  The civil 
right movements in the early postwar period also opened up more opportunity of 
tertiary education for girls and African Americans. 
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 In fact, Japanese business leaders in the early postwar period often opposed to 
expansion of the tertiary education11.  Japan, a late-comer to industrialization, had 
been the labor-abundant society till around 1960. The business leaders wanted 
low-wage blue-collar workers rather than high-wage highly educated workers.  In 
addition, the secondary education received priority in the government’s educational 
expenditures because the enrollment in lower secondary schools surged ahead.  This 
surge came from the extension of the compulsory education from 6 to 9 years in 1947 
and the baby-boom in the early 1950s.   
Even after the 1960s, the government continued its restrictive policy on 
expansion of tertiary education till around 1990.  This is mainly because the 
government feared that expansion of tertiary education would result in the 
deterioration of quality of tertiary education (although many researchers are skeptical 
about whether this restrictive policy was effective in maintaining the quality of 
education)12.   
Japan’s tertiary education policy changed around 1990 from suppression to 
expansion.  The government allowed more flexibility for universities in setting 
enrollment quota and curricula.  As a result, as Figure 6 shows, Japan’s catching-up in 
tertiary education restarted around 1990.  
 The author’s dataset (2005) gives comprehensive information on Japan’s 
vocational education, too.  The definition of vocational education differs according to 
researchers.  This paper defines vocational education as ‘post-compulsory education at 
the schools (or courses) that provide mainly vocational training.’  The post-secondary 
education is not included in vocational education in this paper13.  Figure 7 shows the 
historical change in enrollment of vocational education (flow data). The government 
employed Vocational Education Order in 1897, and various types of vocational schools 
have been established since then.  One of the most popular vocational schools in the 
prewar period was Vocational Supplementary School (VSS).  Accepting graduates from 
elementary school, VSS provided reviews of elementary education and practical 
knowledge for farming, manufacturing and merchandising.  While most of VSS started 
                                                  
11 See Kaneko and Kobayashi (1996: pp141-145). 
12  Many Japanese universities were established in the large cities which had suffered from 
overpopulation during the high growth era.  Thus, alleviation of congestion in the large cities was 
another reason for the suppression of tertiary education.  
13 This paper’s definition of vocational education is same as Godo and Hayami (1999).  Godo and 
Hayami (1999) provide the concrete list of vocational education. 
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on local people’s initiative, the government gradually increased its commitments to VSS.  
According to the regime shift towards wartime, the government reformed VSS to Adult 
School.  Adult School provided a mixture of military and vocational training for 
youngsters who were not promoted middle school after graduation from elementary 
school.  The expansion of Adult School resulted in the sharp increase in vocational 
school enrollment in the 1920s and 30s in Figure 7. 
 In 1947, the Japanese education system was reformed.  The new system 
employed the so-called ‘6-3-3’ system.  Three years at junior high schools were added to 
the six years of education at elementary schools to form the new compulsory education 
system.  The upper secondary education was unified into 3-year-long senior high 
schools.  There are two types of senior high school.  One is vocational high school and 
the other is general high school.  Most of prewar Japan’s vocational schools, including 
Adult School, were abolished in 1947.  Vocational high education has been provided 
mostly in vocational high school in the postwar period14.  Gender discrimination in 
schooling opportunities was also eliminated. This system has remained essentially 
unchanged until today. 
 Because of the abolishment of Adult School in 1947, the enrollment of 
vocational education dropped sharply from 1945 to 50.  According to the increase in 
vocational high schools, the enrollment of vocational education increased from 1950 to 
1968.  After that, the enrollment gradually decreased throughout the 1970s.  
Interestingly, the enrollment was kept almost constant in the 1980s, and went on a 
downward trend again in the 1990s.     
 The stock data of vocational education provides insightful features on the 
postwar Japan’s miraculous economic growth (Figure 8). Average schooling of vocational 
education for the entire working-age population had been at a plateau during the high 
growth era (from the early postwar period to around 1970).  This implies that 
vocational education stock had a significant contribution on postwar Japan’s miraculous 
economic growth.  Education researchers often criticize prewar Japan’s military 
training in Adult School.  It must be true that military training is far from the ideal of 
education. This paper neither rationalizes nor advocates for military training.  Instead, 
this paper wants to state an objective view that who had received military and 
vocational education in Adult School in the prewar period bore the destiny of the 
                                                  
14 Technical College, another type of vocational school, was established in 1962.  For the postwar 
period, only vocational high school and technical college are counted as vocational education in this 
paper.  
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Japanese economy in the high growth era.   
 Figure 8 also provides average schooling of vocational education for younger 
workers (aged 15-39) and elder workers (aged 40-64) separately.  As can be seen, 
vocational education stock in younger generation exceeds that in elder generation till 
1960, and the pattern changed inverse since then.  1960 coincides the year where 
Japanese economy turned from labor abundant economy to labor shortage economy15.  
Thus, Figure 7 tells a plausible story: The labor-intensive industries led Japanese 
economy based on young workers who had received rich vocational training till around 
1960.  After that, with the leadership of veteran workers and middle- and 
top-managers who had vocational knowledge and experience, Japanese manufacturers 
remodeled themselves to produce higher value added products16.  
 
5. Korea’s catching-up with the US 
 
As is the case of Japan, this paper takes the Korea/US ratios for economic and 
economic indicators in Figures 9 and 10.  These figures exhibit interesting similarities 
between Japan and Korea.  First, educational catching-up precedes economic catching 
up.  Second, the order of educational catching-up by level is also same as Japan’s case: 
primary level is the first, the secondary level is the second, and the tertiary level is the 
third.  Third, catching-up in tertiary education stagnated in the 1970s, when Korea 
sped up its heavy industrialization.  In fact, the regime of President Pak Chong-hui 
(1961-79) severely controlled the number of enrollment in universities17.  Instead, the 
regime was devoted in expansion of primary and secondary education under the slogan 
of ‘eradication of the illiterate.’  As is the case of Japan’s early prewar period, President 
Pak Chong-hui considered that low-wage blue-collar workers were more useful for 
Korea’s industrialization than high-wage high-educated workers.  
In spite of these similarities between the two countries, Korea achieved the 
educational catching-up in a shorter period than Japan had done.  In Japan, the 
economic catching-up started in the middle of the 1950s.  Thus, it was nearly 60 years 
after Japan had started educational catching-up in the late 19th century.  The 
Japan/US ratios in average schooling, per-capita GDP and physical capital-labor ratio 
in the middle of the 1950s were 0.7, 0.3 and 0.2 respectively.  In Korea, the economic 
                                                  
15 Minami (2002). 
16 Panasonic, Sony and Honda are good examples. 
17 See, McGinn, Snodgrass, Kim, Kim and Kim (1980) and Kim (2000). 
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catching-up started in the middle of the 1960s.  It was nearly 30 years (half of Japan’s 
case) after Korea had started its educational catching-up with the US around the 1930s.  
The Korea/US ratios in average schooling, per-capita GDP and physical capital-labor 
ratio in the middle of 1950 were 0.3, 0.1 and 0.05 respectively, which are much lower 
than Japan’s starting points.  Korea’s stagnation of catching-up of tertiary education 
(nearly 10 years) is much shorter than Japan’s (nearly 40 years), too. 
 Thus, it should be legitimate to argue that Korea’s catching-up has a shorter 
“runway” and a higher rate of “climb” than Japan’s. Korea’s economic development has 
often been described as “compressed version of Japan’s.18”  This paper’s analyses show 
that Korea’s educational development is also described as “compressed version of 
Japan’s.” 
 Why did Korea achieve educational and economic development in a shorter 
period than Japan?  This may be attributable to the “advantage of backwardness” as 
Gerschenkron (1962) argues.  Another possibility is the development of the IT industry 
in the postwar period.  More investigation is obviously necessary, but it is beyond the 
scope of this paper’s analysis 
 
6. Taiwan’s catching-up with the US 
 
Figure 11 and 12 show the Taiwan/US ratios in educational and economic 
indicators.  The biggest difference from Japan and Korea is that the Taiwan/US ratio 
in per-capita GDP exceeded that in average schooling in the prewar period (Figure 11).  
Japan and Korea did not have such a period.  This phenomenon should be attributable 
to the fact that the agricultural industry (in particular sugar production) led the 
Taiwanese economy in the prewar period.  Taiwan’s agricultural GDP grew almost 
parallel to the Taiwan’s overall GDP from 1915 to 30 (Mizoguchi and Umemura 1988).  
This makes a sharp contrast with Korea’s and Japan’s cases where the share of 
agriculture in GDP decreased significantly in the same period.  Many economists 
assert that education is less important in agriculture than in modern industries19.  
This may be the reason why prewar Taiwan’s per-capita GDP was so high compared 
with its educational level. 
In the postwar period, when the leading industry in Taiwan changed from the 
                                                  
18 See Watanabe (1992). 
19 For example, see Lockheed, Jamison and Lau (1980), Yang (1998), Otsuka and Place (2001) and 
Fafchamps and Quisumbing (1999). 
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agricultural sector to the manufacturing sector, Taiwan’s educational catching-up 
preceded its economic catching-up just as in the cases of Japan and Korea.  Still, the 
gap between educational catching-up and economic catching-up was smaller in Taiwan 
compared with Japan and Korea.  Namely, Japan and Korea experienced some periods 
when the Japan/US (or Korea/US) ratio in average schooling recorded over 30 percent 
point higher than that in per-capita GDP (Figures 5 and 9), but Taiwan has never 
experienced such period (Figure 11).   
 It should be noted that, compared with Japan and Korea, postwar Taiwan’s 
industrialization did not heavily rely on the process industries (such as shipbuilding 
and iron and steel refinery that need huge amount of physical capital).  Instead, 
medium- and small-size enterprises led Taiwan’s industrialization.  Thus, Taiwan’s 
industrialization less relied on physical capital stock than Japan’s and Korea’s. This 
results in the fact that the Taiwan/US ratio in per-capita GDP constantly exceeds that 
in physical capital-labor ratio in Figure 11.  
 Another of Taiwan’s unique points is that secondary education and tertiary 
education caught up with the US at almost the same speed.  There was no stagnation 
in catching-up in tertiary education.  This is a big difference from Japan’s and Korea’s 
experiences. 
 Above observations indicate that Taiwan’s experience of catching-up is 
smoother than Japan‘s and Korea’s in the following three senses: 1), gender gap 
diminished faster in Taiwan (as was mentioned in Section 2, 2), the gap between 
educational and economic catching-up was smaller in Taiwan, and 3), Taiwan had no 
stagnation in catching-up in tertiary education.   
 While Korea and Taiwan experienced high economic growth in similar periods 
by borrowing advanced technologies from the US and Japan, why do these two countries 
differ in the pattern of educational catching-up?  This paper’s understanding is that 
this difference in educational catching-up comes from the difference of the type of 
economic entities which bore the task of technology-borrowing.  In Korea, huge 
conglomerates, called chaebol, introduced advanced technologies from the West 
(including Japan), and in Taiwan, medium- and small-size entrepreneurs did it.  
Taiwanese entrepreneurs were so light-footed that they started their businesses with 
technologies within easy reach.  So, the technologies of Korean firms had more scale 
economy than those of Taiwanese firms.  Thus, demands of Korean firms for a mass of 
homogenous, so-so educated workers was much stronger than those of Taiwanese firms.    
Since Taiwan relied less on the process industries that require heavy manual labor, 
Taiwan’s educational development was less biased in favor of males.   
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7. Implications of the time-lag between educational and economic catching-up  
 
The analyses in the previous sections find that educational catching-up 
preceded economic catching-up in the three East Asian countries.  This finding implies 
that it took a seriously long period for a late-comer country to start up industrialization.  
Even if a country invests in education today, it will take time to increase in educational 
stock.  In addition, there is the time-lag between educational and economic catching-up.  
Such a long “maternity” period may not be affordable for today’s developing countries, 
which are often exposed to the crises of the regime. 
 This time-lag raises another question about those three countries’ experience: 
why had Japan, Korea and Taiwan invested heavily in education before their economic 
catching-up started?  One of the reasons should be attributable to the governments’ 
initiative.  The political leaders in those three countries emphasized the importance of 
education from the very early stages of development.  In Japan, the government after 
the Meiji Restoration encouraged and persuaded (even with intimidation by police force) 
children to attend schools as a measure of reigning over the country.  The promotion of 
Adult School (as was mentioned in Section 3) is another example of the forcible 
expansion of education for ordinary families.  The Government -General of Korea 
extended schooling as a part of the assimilation policy in the 1930s.  President Pak 
Chong-hui also stated “the annihilation of illiteracy” as the top national target.  The 
National Party in Taiwan also emphasized education in order to assimilate Taiwanese 
with Chinese.   
 However, more important is people’s spontaneity.  Many researchers observe 
ordinary families’ enthusiasm of sending their children to schools even before the 
beginning of their economic catching-up.  In Meiji Japan, as was mentioned in Section 
3, VSS developed nationwide spontaneously.  Many ordinary families welcomed the 
government’s encouragement for Adult School because it meant more chances of 
education.  Kimura (1988) asserts that postwar Korea’s explosive increase in 
enrollment should be attributable more to the ordinary families’ enthusiasm for getting 
education than to the government’s initiative.  McGinn, Snodgrass, Kim , Kim, and 
Kim (1980) also find that Koreans were surprisingly eager for education even in the 
chaotic 1950s (in the wake of the Pacific War and the Korean War).  Abe and Abe 
(1971) report that demands for education in Taiwan surged rapidly beyond the control 
and expectation of the Taiwanese government in the early postwar period.  
 Why were people in those three countries so ardent in education even without 
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sufficient macroeconomic fruits?  This paper’s understanding is that the ‘screening 
effect’ functioned.  The Meiji Restoration shuffled the Japanese society entirely.  The 
Korean and Taiwanese societies experienced the upheaval by Japanese colonialization 
and the Pacific War, followed by civil wars.  Thus, the new elite strata were about to be 
formed in those countries.  All the children in ordinary families had a chance to join 
new elites if they had a better education career than others.  Conversely, people 
received a big pressure not to fall behind others in school career.  Thus, the private 
return to school was high even before the beginning of economic catching-up.  This is 
exactly the case of the ‘screening effect.’  Usually, researchers use the term of 
‘screening effect’ as a negative meaning.  However, in Japan, Korea and Taiwan, the 
‘screening effect’ helped their societies to endure the heavy burden of the long 
“maternity” period of educational investments. 
 
8 Conclusion 
 
 This paper asserted that the East Asian economic successes can be 
characterized as ‘military-style heavy industrialization.’  Roughly speaking, their 
society was rich in so-so educated, homogeneous laborers during the miraculous 
economic growth periods.  These laborers worked together methodically at factories 
(instead of military camps).  
Japan, Korea and Taiwan succeeded in forming uniform societies, which were 
suited for ‘military-style heavy industrialization,’ through long-range educational 
investments.  The screening effect helped those countries to endure the long 
‘maternity’ period between educational and economic catching-up. The well-timed 
suppression of the opportunities of tertiary education by the Japanese and Korean 
governments was effective in achieving their rapid heavy industrialization.  The heavy 
investments in vocational education in prewar Japan bore fruit in the postwar high 
growth era.   
In today’s developing countries, expansion of secondary and higher education 
tends to receive higher priority than achievement of universal education20.  This is 
different from the pattern of educational development in Japan Korea and Taiwan 
where catching-up in primary education preceded catching-up in secondary and tertiary 
education.   
 All the findings of this paper must be informative for today’s developing 
                                                  
20 For example, see Szirmai (2005: p.238) and Tan (1999: pp.55-60). 
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countries, which aim to follow the East Asian success stories.  However, obviously, the 
situation of developing countries in the 21st century is different from the East Asian 
countries in the 20th century.  First, in contrast to the single ethnic societies such as 
Japan, Korea and Taiwan, many of today’s developing countries suffer seriously from 
the multi-ethnicity problems.  Since curricula of elementary and secondary education 
are closely related to lifestyle, simple expansion of education without due consideration 
of ethnicity may provoke the conflicts between the governments and local citizens.  As 
this paper argued in Section 7, Japan, Korea and Taiwan succeeded in forming a mass 
of homogeneous laborers that is suitable for heavy industrialization.  However, in 
multi-ethnic countries, such strategy may not work.  Second, in the 21st century, heavy 
industrialization may not be synonymous with economic development as was in the 20th 
century.  Importantly, secondary industry has been reducing its percentage in the 
World GDP since the middle of 1970s (World Bank, 2005). The non-manufacturing 
sectors such as the IT industries may lead the economy of developing countries in the 
21st centuries.  If so, ‘military-style heavy industrialization’ may not be an appropriate 
development strategy for today’s developing countries. 
 Still, it should be legitimate to assert that clarifying the characteristics of the 
20th century style economic development is important for all the academicians and 
non-academicians who are concerned with the development policies in today’s 
developing countries.  The author’s dataset, on which this paper relied, will be 
published soon from the website of the FASID21.  Using this dataset as a ‘public good,’ 
various empirical analyses should be made in the near future22. 
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Table 1 Human capital accumulation through educational investments in USA,  
Japan, Korea and Taiwan
USA Japan Koreac Taiwan USA Japan Koreac Taiwan
1890 40 26 n.a. n.a. 6.5 1.3 n.a. n.a.
1900 40 38 n.a. 4 7.2 2.0 n.a. 0.4
1910 62 43 8d 6 7.7 3.3 n.a. 0.5
1920 68 51 11 14 8.3 4.3 0.6 0.6
1930 73 58 16 18 9.1 5.6 0.8 1.0
1940 74 62 38 34 9.8 6.5 1.1 1.6
1950 78 70 n.a. 32 10.5 7.6 n.a. 2.5
1960 85 75 56 57 11.3 8.7 3.3 3.6
1970 87 78 68 65 12.0 9.8 4.8 5.1
1980 85 87 77 73 12.8 10.7 6.9 7.3
1990 87 85 80 81 13.5 11.5 9.0 9.1
2000 89 87 89 86 14.0 12.3 10.5 10.9
a. For persons age 6-20 years.
b. Average number of years of schooling per person in the working-age population
(persons age 15-64 years).
c. Korea before 1945 means all the Korean Peninsula.  Korea thereafter 
means the Repiblic of Korea (South Korea).
d. 1912 value.
Source: Godo (2005), Godo and Fukami (2005).
Enrollment ratioa   (%) Average schooling
b
(yrs/psn)
Table 2 The percentage of population aged 15-39 in the total population and the
Percentage of manufactring sector in the total laborforce in Japan, Korea
and Taiwan
Japan Koreab Taiwan Japan Koreab Taiwan
1910 38.1 40.3 43.9 14.0 1.2c 7.8d
1920 37.5 38.7 39.7 18.3 1.7 8.8
1930 38.3 37.9 39.0 17.1 1.9 9.8
1940 38.1 38.2 37.3 22.5 4.2 10.9
1950 39.3 n.a. 40.7 n.a. 7.0 13.9e
1955 40.2 34.0 38.4 20.7 7.6 15.1
1960 42.2 36.7 37.5 25.0 8.2 17.1
1965 44.8 36.9f 37.7 27.9 10.4 18.5
1970 43.8 37.7 38.4 29.2 14.3 22.5
1975 40.6 40.9 41.3 28.0 19.1 28.6
1980 38.6 43.1 43.4 26.5 22.5 33.7
1985 37.0 45.3 45.0 26.7 24.4 34.1
1990 35.3 47.4 45.2 25.3 27.6 32.3
1995 34.4 46.4 44.4 22.4 23.6 27.2
2000 33.6 47.2 42.6 20.6 20.2 28.1
a.Includes mining.
b.Korea refers to all the Korean Peninsula until its interdependence
   from Japan (in 1945) and the Republic of Kora (South Korea) thereafter.
c.1911 value.
d.1908 value.
e.1951 value.
ｆ.1966 value.
Source: For Japan, Godo (2005), Government of Japan (various issues).
For Korea, Godo (2005), Pyo (2001), Bank of Korea (various issues).
For Taiwan, Godo and Fukami (2005), Moon (2002), Director-General of Budget,
     Accounting and Statistics(various issues).
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a. Average number of years of schooling per person in the working-age population (persons age 15-64 years).
b. Korea refers to the whole Korea (all the Korean Peninsula) until its interdependence from Japan (in 1945) and the
   Republic of Kora (South Korea) thereafter.
Source: Godo (2005), Godo and Fukami (2005)
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Source: Godo (2005), Godo and Fukami (2005).
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Figure 3 Comparison of per-capita GDP among Korea, Japan Taiwan, and USA
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Source: Godo (2005), Godo and Fukami (2005).
Figure 4 Labor input per GDP versus physical capital per GDP
USA (1890-2000), Japan （1890-1940、1948-2000）、Korea （1920-45、1955-2000)、Taiwan (1912-34, 1952-2000）
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Figure 5. The Japan/USA ratios in average schooling  a, per-capita GDP and physical capital-labor ratio
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         a. Average number of years of schooling per person in the total working-age population..
         b. Labor is measured by total employment. Physical capital is measured by gross nonresidential non-military
             physical capital stock at the beginning of year.  GDP is measured in PPP 1990 USA dollars.
Source; Godo (2005).
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Figure 6 The Japan/USA ratios in average schooling a by levels of education
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                a. Average number of years of schooling per person in the working-age population.
                b. Schooling of 1st to 8th grades.
                c. Schooling of 9th to 12th grades.
                 d. Schooling of beyond 12th grade.
      Source:  Godo(2005).
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Figure 7 Enrollment of vocational educationa in Japan
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a. Vocational education is defined as post-compulsory education at the schools (or courses) that provide mainly vocational
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Figure 8 Average schooling a of vocational educationb in Japan
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a..Korea in the pre- and post-war periods refers to all the Korean Peninsula and the Republic of Korea respectively.
b. Average number of years of schooling per person in the total working-age population..
c. Labor is measured by total employment. Capital is measured by gross nonresidential non-military physical capital
   stock at the beginning of year.  GDP is measured in PPP 1990 USA dollars.
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Figure 9 The Korea/USA ratios in average schooling b, per-capita GDP and physical capital-labor ratio
Source: Godo(2005)
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Figure 10 The Koreaa/US ratios in average schooling b by levels of education
a. Korea in the pre- and post-war periods refers to all the Korean Peninsula and the Republic of Korea respectively.
b. Average number of years of schooling per person in the working-age population.
c. Schooling of 1st to 8th grades.
d. Schooling of 9th to 12th grades.
e. Schooling of beyond 12th grade.
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 Figure 11 The Taiwan/USA ratios in average schooling  a, per-capita GDP and physical capital-labor ratio
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         a. Average number of years of schooling per person in the total working-age population..
         b. Labor is measured by total employment. Pysical capital is measured by gross nonresidential non-military physical
            capital stock at the beginning of year.  GDP is measured in PPP 1990 USA dollars.
Source: Godo and Fukami (2005)..
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Figure 12 The Taiwan/USA ratios in average schooling a by levels of education
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a. Average number of years of schooling per person in the working-age population.
b. Schooling of 1st to 8th grades.
c. Schooling of 9th to 12th grades.
d. Schooling of beyond 12th grade.
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  Source: Godo and Fukami (2005).
